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ABSTRACT 
 The international human rights system of which international 
human rights law (IHRL) is a part has been critiqued for being 
ineffective, too legal, insufficiently self-critical, and elitist, with some 
claiming that it self-generates some of the challenges it faces. This 
Article challenges this presentation of IHRL and in doing so, sets out 
three priorities for its future development. These are first, that it should 
continue to engage in critical analysis of how IHRL can effectively 
respond to the complex and multifactorial challenges it faces. Second, 
rather than refrain from developing due to critiques of overexpansion, 
IHRL should prioritize the articulation and adaptation of how IHRL 
applies to groups who struggle to enjoy their rights in practice and to 
new contexts and global challenges, such as artificial intelligence. 
Third, it should develop and deepen the methodology to the 
operationalization of IHRL further to ensure that it embeds within the 
agendas of key actors that can bring about change, including across 
state agencies as well as within businesses and social movements.  
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I. INTRODUCTION  
 In recent years, scholarship has burgeoned on the challenges faced 
by the international human rights system. This literature has critically 
assessed the effectiveness and impact of international human rights 
law (IHRL).1 These themes are often examined through the lens of 
compliance with treaty commitments and implementation,  referring 
to both the “legal implementation,” of the decisions or 
recommendations of international human rights bodies,2 and “the 
operational delivery of human rights within communities and 
beyond.”3 Scholars have analyzed the mainstreaming of human rights 
beyond institutions and agencies with a dedicated mandate on human 
rights, for example, mainstreaming human rights throughout the 
United Nations (UN).4 Some have focused on the “pushback” and 
 
1 See generally KATHRYN SIKKINK, EVIDENCE FOR HOPE: MAKING HUMAN RIGHTS WORK 
IN THE 21ST CENTURY (Princeton Univ. Press 2019); Rebekah Thomas et al., Assessing 
the Impact of a Human Rights-Based Approach across a Spectrum of Change for 
Women’s, Children’s, and Adolescent’s Health, 17 HEALTH & HUM. RTS. J. 11 (2015) 
(discussing the challenges with measuring human rights impact due to the integration 
of human rights into policies and practices but also the need to measure individual, 
structural and societal change). 
2 See, e.g., COURTNEY HILLEBRECHT, DOMESTIC POLITICS AND INTERNATIONAL HUMAN 
RIGHTS TRIBUNALS: THE PROBLEM OF COMPLIANCE 504–17 (Cambridge Univ. Press 
2014); BETH A. SIMMONS, MOBILIZING FOR HUMAN RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL LAW IN 
DOMESTIC POLITICS 114–24 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2009); Cossette Creamer & Beth 
Simmons, Ratification, Reporting and Rights: Quality of Participation in the Convention 
against Torture, 37 HUM. RTS. Q. 579, 583 (2015); Alexandra Huneeus, Courts Resisting 
Courts: Lessons from the Inter-American Court’s Struggle to Enforce Human Rights, 44 
CORNELL INT'L L.J. 493, 505 (2011). 
3 For an extensive discussion of these terms, see Paul Hunt, Configuring the UN Human 
Rights System in the “Era of Implementation”: Mainland and Archipelago, 39 HUM. RTS. 
Q. 489, 497 (2017). 
4 Geoff Gilbert & Anna Magdalena Rusch, Rule of Law and United Nations 
Interoperability, 30 INT’L J. REFUGEE L. 31 (2018). 
“backlash” experienced by parts of the system.5 This has included 
critiques of the international human rights system, particularly the 
global institutions established to promote and protect human rights 
and international human rights law (IHRL). The system has been 
invariably critiqued for being ineffective, too legal, insufficiently self-
critical, and elitist.6 As a result, some claim that the system self-
generates some of the challenges it faces.7 IHRL and its related 
institutions have also been criticized both for overexpansion of rights 
and for addressing the human rights implications of enduring and 
emerging global challenges, such as climate change, artificial 
intelligence, and inequality.8  
 This Article challenges these critiques and in doing so, identifies 
three priorities for the future of IHRL, if it is to remain an effective 
branch of international law mandated to promote and protect human 
rights. This Article first examines the claim that the international 
human rights system is insufficiently self-critical and generates many 
of the pressures it is experiencing.9 It questions this proposition and 
suggests that a priority for IHRL is to diagnose the complex and 
multifactorial threats to human rights and critically assess how it can 
best contribute to addressing these threats. Part II makes this point in 
three ways. First, claims that IHRL and its related institutions 
constitute a major source of pushback and backlash have to be 
approached with care as history demonstrates the potential for states 
and other actors to levy criticisms at IHRL and its institutions as a 
means of pursuing particular political agendas, rather than revealing 
intrinsic deficiencies within IHRL. Second, pushback and backlash on 
the international human rights system are multifactorial and variable 
depending on the actor, issue, and point in time. It is difficult, 
 
5 Mikael Rask Madsen, Pola Cebulak & Micha Wiebusch, Backlash Against 
International Courts: Explaining the Forms and Patterns of Resistance to International 
Courts, 14 INT’L J.L. CONTEXT 197, 198 (2018) (arguing “there is a difference between 
mere pushback from individual Member States or other actors, seeking to influence the 
future direction of an IC’s case-law and actual backlash in terms of critique triggering 
significant institutional reform or even the dismantling of tribunals, the latter typically 
involving the collective action of Member States”); see also Malcolm Langford, Critiques 
of Human Rights, 14 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 69, 70 (2018) (observing that while 
critiques of human rights are not new, the volume has increased as has the “apocalyptic 
predictions”).   
6 See STEPHEN HOPGOOD, THE END TIMES OF HUMAN RIGHTS 4–5 (Cornell Univ. Press 
2013) (arguing the international system is too international); ERIC POSNER, THE 
TWILIGHT OF HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 137 (2014) (arguing the system is ineffective); Andrew 
Fagan, The Gentrification of Human Rights, 41 HUM. RTS. Q. 283, 285 (2019) (arguing 
the international system is too elite); Ingrid Wuerth, International Law in the Post-
Human Rights Era, 96 TEX. L. REV. 279, 314 (2017).   
7 See John Tasioulas, Saving Human Rights from Human Rights Law, 52 VAND. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. (forthcoming Nov. 2019) (manuscript at 1) (on file with author). 
8 See, e.g., HURST HANNUM, RESCUING HUMAN RIGHTS: A RADICALLY MODERATE 
APPROACH (2019) (critiquing international human rights law for being overly expansive 
in dealing with every “social issue”); SAMUEL MOYN, NOT ENOUGH: HUMAN RIGHTS IN AN 
UNEQUAL WORLD (Harv. Univ. Press 2018) (critiquing human rights for not dealing with 
inequality).  
9 See Tasioulas, supra note 7.  
therefore, to make generalized or universally applicable statements 
about the weight of particular pressures.10 Moreover, apportioning 
responsibility for pushback and backlash to “internal pressures” risks 
underplaying the significant structural factors, global challenges, and 
shifts in scope conditions that currently present major threats to 
human rights and need to be addressed. Third, the multidisciplinary 
scholarship on human rights, particularly in relation to compliance, 
implementation, and mainstreaming, displays a critical edge and is 
increasingly engaged with in an interdisciplinary manner, including 
within international legal literature. This scholarship thus displaces 
the inference made by some scholars that the international human 
rights system lacks self-reflection by overly focusing on external 
threats but is rather engaged in critical analysis of how to address the 
complex challenges faced by human rights. In this regard, this Article 
suggests that rather than trying to compartmentalize potential sources 
of pressure on IHRL based on whether they are “internal” or “external,” 
a priority for the future of IHRL is to diagnose the range of threats to 
human rights and to critically assess the extent to which the 
international human rights system—which includes, but is not limited 
to IHRL—can effectively anticipate these threats and societal needs. 
 In Part III, this Article argues that a second priority for IHRL is 
to develop effective approaches to interpreting how IHRL applies to 
groups who are unable to enjoy their rights in practice, such as the 
current debates on the rights of older persons, as well as to adapt 
existing IHRL to new contexts, such as climate change and artificial 
intelligence. Rather than respond to critiques of the “endless” or “over-
expansion”11 of IHRL by freezing its development, IHRL needs to 
ensure that it continues to apply and remain relevant where human 
rights are at risk. This can be achieved by demonstrating that IHRL 
rarely expands to pronounce entirely new rights, although in 
exceptional circumstances this will be appropriate. Rather, most 
activity labelled as “expansion” is more accurately characterized as the 
articulation of how existing IHRL applies to particular groups or new 
contexts. This distinction needs to be made much clearer so that the 
articulation and application of IHRL to particular groups and new 
contexts through interpretative and adaptive techniques, is prioritized 
in order to ensure that IHRL remains relevant and resilient to the 
needs of changing societies. This point is often missed by commentators 
who argue that IHRL endlessly expands in a generalized manner 
without assessment the type of instruments being created.  
 In Part IV, this Article acknowledges that IHRL cannot address 
the threats posed to human rights on its own, but rather a 
multidisciplinary approach continues to be required, particularly 
where the threats emanate from changes in scope and structural 
conditions in society or relate to global challenges, such as artificial 
 
10 See Karima Bennoune, In Defense of Human Rights, 52 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 
(forthcoming Nov. 2019) (discussing the use of general statements). 
11 HANNUM, supra note 8, at 32.  
intelligence and climate change.12 However, IHRL stands a better 
chance of forming a part of wider approaches where it is embedded 
within the agendas, policies, and practices of actors that are in a 
position to impact human rights.13 In this regard, the 
operationalization dimension to the implementation of IHRL will 
remain central to the future agenda of the branch. As major actors 
within and across states, the operationalization of human rights by 
businesses continues to be critical. In addition, operationalization of 
IHRL within the different levels of the state reflects an underexamined 
part of the implementation agenda. This includes ministries beyond 
the foreign office and the ministry of justice,14 as well as at the local 
and the municipal levels. The operationalization of IHRL also needs to 
be considered in relation to the agendas of social movements, and in 
dealing with global challenges. This is not with the view to expand or 
change IHRL, but to articulate the value added of including IHRL 
within wider approaches to social and political change. The 
multidisciplinary, multilevel, mainstreaming, and operationalization 
of human rights all introduce new layers of complexity, particularly 
from a management perspective, as the international human rights 
system now constitutes a complex and diffuse regime. The development 
of synergies within the system therefore reflects a key dimension that 
will impact the future of IHRL.  
 By focusing on implementation (particularly operationalization), 
the international human rights system is also able to respond to 
another sustained critique, which is the claim that it overly focuses on 
courts. The operationalization of human rights requires a plurality of 
methods and approaches. Such pluralization thereby relieves the 
pressure and expectation placed on courts to be one of the main or only 
means of realizing human rights. Recognition of the place of courts 
within a plural methodology may then create space for the revaluing 
of the critical role that courts have played in the development of IHRL 
and the delivery of justice for individuals and groups. This point is 
often missed in scholarship and in practice with courts, often depicted 
negatively due to the absence or the inadequacy of other structures. 
Since judicial approaches to human rights typically work best when 
part of wider strategies, the pluralization of methods should enhance 
the effectiveness of courts.15   
 
12 See Cesar Rodriguez-Garavito, The Future of Human Rights: From Gatekeeping to 
Symbiosis, 20 SUR – INT’L J. HUM. RTS. 499, 502 (2014) (noting that “important topics 
such as climate change, which profoundly affect human rights . . . cannot be understood 
or acted upon without the participation of professionals from other fields.”). 
13 This is the approach adopted, for example, by the EU. EU Action Plan on Human 
Rights and Democracy, COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 31–36 (Dec. 2015), 
https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/eu_action_plan_on_human_rights_and_democrac
y_en_2.pdf [https://perma.cc/6GYX-RWMV] (archived Sept. 16, 2019). 
14 See Hunt, supra note 3, 511–12 (discussing the use of various specialized agencies 
“brought into relationship with the United Nations”). 
15 See Bennoune, supra note 10; see also James T. Gathii, Variation in the Use of 
Subregional Integration Courts between Business and Human Rights Actors: The Case of 
the East African Court of Justice, 79 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 37, 60–61 (2019) (noting 
II. THE FUTURE OF IHRL I: EFFECTIVELY DIAGNOSING AND 
ADDRESSING THE MULTILAYERED THREATS TO HUMAN 
RIGHTS   
 Responding to recent lectures on the future of IHRL by Philip 
Alston, the UN Special Rapporteur on Extreme Poverty and Human 
Rights, and Zeid Ra’ad Al Hussein, who was, at the time, the UN High 
Commissioner for Human Rights, John Tasioulas has pointed to “a 
startling omission.”16 He argues that both authors examine “external” 
threats to human rights, such as populism, but neither “contemplates 
the possibility that some of the most serious pressures on IHRL are 
internally generated, pressures arising from serious defects in the 
elaboration of human rights law and the self-understanding of its 
practitioners and scholars.”17 He charges the internally generated 
pressures within IHRL with the “breeding [of] scepticism about human 
rights law that may end up becoming, by a foreseeable if not justifiable 
process of blowback, scepticism about human rights morality itself.”18 
Tasioulas therefore attributes significant responsibility for the current 
pushback and backlash on human rights to IHRL and its institutions 
rather than external factors.19  
 This Part of the Article examines the claim that the pushback on 
human rights is “self-generated” by showing how claims of self-
generation can often be used as a distraction technique and overlook 
the current critical approaches to IHRL from within. This Part also 
suggests that such an apportionment of responsibility for “blowback” 
on human rights risks diverting attention away from the complex and 
multifactorial reasons for pushback. It suggests that rather than 
seeking to attribute responsibility for pushback to “internal” or 
“external” sources, the international human rights system needs to 
prioritize the development of effective ways in which to address the 
range and complexity of challenges the system is facing.   
 
A. Scrutinizing the Validity of Claims that Backlash is Self-
Generated 
 
 Claims that IHRL self-generates pushback and backlash require 
close scrutiny, as states and other actors have sometimes levied 
criticisms at IHRL and its institutions, not because of an intrinsic 
failing, but as a vehicle for the pursuit of a particular set of domestic 
 
that more than just litigation is necessary and a goal of compliance should only be “one 
of a broader set of strategies in the effort to democratize authoritarian societies”).  
16 See Prince Zeid Ra’ad Al Hussein, U.N. High Comm’r for Human Rights, Speech at 
the BIICL Annual Grotius Lecture: Is International Human Rights Law Under Threat? 
(July 26, 2017) (transcript available at the British Institute of International and 
Comparative Law); Tasioulas, supra note 7 (discussing Philip Alston, The Populist 
Challenge to Human Rights, 9 J. HUM. RTS. PRAC. 1, 1–15 (2017)). 
17 See Tasioulas, supra note 7; Ra’ad Al Hussein, supra note 16. 
18 See Tasioulas, supra note 7; Ra’ad Al Hussein, supra note 16. 
19 See Tasioulas, supra note 7; Ra’ad Al Hussein, supra note 16. 
politics. For example, Sonia Cardenas shows how norm collision can 
materialize in different sociopolitical contexts raising the potential for 
pushback, and even backlash, against human rights.20 States can build 
counterdiscourse21 by critiquing the international human rights 
system, IHRL or its institutions, claiming that they are overreaching, 
unduly interfering in domestic affairs, or adopting overly evolutive 
interpretations of the law.22 Such an approach presents the system, 
including IHRL and its institutions, as “part of the problem,” whereas 
it may actually be a guise or vehicle for the promotion of a particular 
political position.  
 Scholars have used European Court of Human Rights decisions on 
prisoner voting to make this point.23 Following the then Prime 
Minister David Cameron’s claim that prison voting made him feel 
“physically ill,”24 commentators questioned whether these cases are 
representative of the European Court overreaching itself, particularly 
as it appeared to lead to “inter-state contagion” with Russia following 
suit.25 Zoe Jay challenges such an account.26 She observes that the 
United Kingdom has a high level of compliance with the decisions of 
the European Court, which indicates that it is not generally opposed to 
the court. However, the British government tends to push back against 
cases that touch on issues that are deemed controversial domestically. 
She argues that this is not because the court has overreached itself but 
because certain decisions conflict with a domestic narrative of human 
rights that is different from the European Court’s.27 She argues that 
cases, such as those on prisoner voting and deportation, fall into this 
category because they involve “criminals and terrorists.”28 This means 
that the cases result in pushback not because of the position of the 
European Court per se but because of a domestic political view based 
 
20 See generally SONIA CARDENAS, CONFLICT AND COMPLIANCE: STATE RESPONSES TO 
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS PRESSURE (Cambridge Univ. Press 2007). 
21 This term is taken from Thomas Risse & Stephen C. Ropp, Introduction and Overview, 
in THE PERSISTENT POWER OF HUMAN RIGHTS: FROM COMMITMENT TO COMPLIANCE 5 
(Thomas Risse et al. eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 2013). 
22 See Campbell McLachlan, The Assault on International Adjudication and the Limits 
of Withdrawal, 68 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 499, 513–16 (2019) (discussing and critiquing these 
arguments). 
23 Zoe Jay, Keeping Rights at Home: British Conceptions of Rights and Compliance with 
the European Court of Human Rights, 19 BRIT. J. POL. & INT’L REL. (2017). 
24 Alex Aldridge, Can “Physically Ill” David Cameron Find a Cure for His European 
Allergy?, GUARDIAN, May 6, 2011, https://www.theguardian.com/law/2011/may/06/david-
cameron-european-law-allergy [https://perma.cc/4CB6-NKHF] (archived Sept. 4, 2019).  
25 Philip Leach & Alice Donald, Russia Defies Strasbourg: Is Contagion Spreading?, 
EJIL TALK! (Dec. 19, 2015), https://www.ejiltalk.org/russia-defies-strasbourg-is-
contagion-spreading/ [https://perma.cc/KEP8-B7A8] (archived Sept. 4, 2019).  
26 Jay, supra note 23. 
27 Id. 
28 Id.; see also Erik Voeten, Public Opinion and the Legitimacy of International Courts, 
14 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 411, 418 (2013).   
on parliamentary sovereignty and a claim that a “foreign” court does 
not understand “British values.”29  
 However, these critiques of IHRL and its institutions, and the 
wider system, can shift.30 This is possible because the critiques are 
rooted in political positions which can change and are also not 
necessarily representative of all political positions or parts of the state. 
For example, Alice Donald has pointed out that the British government 
has so far failed to implement the European Court of Human Rights’ 
decision on prisoner voting. However, a joint committee of both houses 
of parliament drafted a bill on the voting eligibility of prisoners as a 
means of implementing the decision.31 This both underscores that 
states are not monoliths and that where the composition of the part of 
the state opposed to a decision by an international court changes, the 
position on implementation may also change. In this regard, backlash 
against the international rule of law often results from objections to 
legal interpretations (even well established and previously 
uncontroversial) that do not fit with contemporary, local politics and 
the self-identity of a state rather than jurisprudence that might be 
framed as pushing at the edges.  
 This is particularly important as while IHRL and its institutions 
require some level of sensitivity, a balance also has to be struck in how 
far they should—and are willing—to adapt to political pushback and 
backlash or claims that they have ‘“caused” the backlash, as this may 
be tied to the politics of the day.32 Moreover, pushback and backlash 
can also sharpen and trigger a countermovement by other states and 
nonstate actors in support of the international rule of law. This can 
include the emergence of new supporters and leaders of international 
law within states and beyond. For example, Steven Jensen points to 
moments in history in which smaller states have turned the course of 
history and garnered support for the international rule of law in the 
face of challenge.33 This connects to a recent assessment of the future 
of the International Criminal Court in which Mark Kersten asks 
whether the court has gone too far towards practicalities in order to 
 
29 Id.  
30 Alice Donald, Tackling Non-Implementation in the Strasbourg System: The Art of the 
Possible?, EJIL TALK! (Apr. 28, 2017), https://www.ejiltalk.org/tackling-non-
implementation-in-the-strasbourg-system-the-art-of-the-possible/ 
[https://perma.cc/KV76-XY3B] (archived Sept. 4, 2019); see also Dia Anagnostou & Alina 
Mungiu-Pippidi, Domestic Implementation of Human Rights Judgments in Europe: Legal 
Infrastructure and Government Effectiveness Matter, 25 EUR. J. INT’L L. 205 (2014); 
Courtney Hillbrecht, The Power of Human Rights Tribunals: Compliance with The 
European Court of Human Rights and Domestic Policy Change, 20 EUR. J. INT’L REL. 
1100 (2014). 
31 See Donald, supra note 30. 
32 See KAREN J. ALTER, NEW TERRAIN OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: COURTS, POLITICS, 
RIGHTS 335–66 (Princeton Univ. Press 2014); see also Langford, supra note 5, at 79. 
33 STEVEN L.B. JENSEN, THE MAKING OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE 1960S, 
DECOLONIZATION, AND THE RECONSTRUCTION OF GLOBAL VALUES (Cambridge Univ. 
Press 2016); see also ANN MARIE CLARK, DIPLOMACY OF CONSCIENCE: AMNESTY 
INTERNATIONAL AND CHANGING HUMAN RIGHTS NORMS (Princeton Univ. Press 2001). 
illustrate its impact and effectiveness and in doing so, has lost some of 
the aspiration that was at the heart of its establishment.34 Accordingly, 
claims that “internal pressures” are the cause (fully, partially, or at all) 
of backlash require critical assessment and location with more complex 
and nuanced readings of the relationship between the local and the 
international at any moment in time.35  
 
B. Recognizing the Complexity and Multifactorial Nature of 
Backlash 
 
 Claims that some of the most serious pressures to IHRL are self-
generated risks underplaying the complexity and multifactorial nature 
of the current backlash on international law and global governance, of 
which IHRL and its institutions are a part.36 It also fails to engage with 
the importance of changes or pressures on “‘enabling’ environments,”37 
or what Thomas Risse and Stephen Ropp refer to as “scope conditions” 
for the realization with human rights.38 
 Risse and Ropp identify five scope conditions that impact the 
realizability of human rights. First, they observe that “regime type 
[democratic or authoritarian] seems to matter.”39 This not only applies 
with regard to the regime type generally but also in relation to the 
existence and role of social mechanisms, including courts (“domestic, 
foreign or international”) that “would bring democracies back into 
compliance,” as well as “mechanisms of persuasion, naming and 
shaming [which] are particularly effective with regard to stable 
democratic regimes.”40 They identify the second scope condition as 
whether states have “the kinds of efficient and effective administrative 
structures and institutions that would allow them to enforce and 
implement central decisions.”41 They frame the third condition as 
 
34 Mark Kersten, Whither the Aspirational ICC, Welcome the “Practical” Court?, EJIL 
TALK! (May 22, 2019), https://www.ejiltalk.org/whither-the-aspirational-icc-welcome-
the-practical-court/ [https://perma.cc/R6TX-BD48] (archived Sept. 4, 2019).  
35 See THE HUMAN RIGHTS PARADOX: HUMAN RIGHTS AND ITS DISCONTENTS 3–28 (Stern 
et al. eds., Univ. of Wisconsin Press 2014). 
36 See THE INTERNATIONAL RULE OF LAW: RISE OR DECLINE? (Heike Krieger et al. eds., 
Oxford Univ Press 2019); Philip Alston, The Populist Challenge to Human Rights, 9 J. 
HUM. RTS. PRACT. 1, 1–15 (2017); Douglas Guilfoyle, The Future of International Law in 
an Authoritarian World, EJIL TALK! (June 3, 2019), https://www.ejiltalk.org/the-future-
of-international-law-in-an-authoritarian-world/ [https://perma.cc/D5RE-HGLF] 
(archived Sept. 4, 2019) (outlining some critiques of international law); Madsen, Cebulak 
& Wiebusch, supra note 5, at 198 (discussing that commentators often explain backlash 
“en bloc” rather than unpacking the different types of “pushback” and “backlash”); Ra’ad 
Al Hussein, supra note 16; McLachlan, supra note 22, at 499. 
37 Thomas et al., supra note 1, at 12. 
38 See Risse & Ropp, supra note 21, at 5; see also Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, How to 
Influence States: Socialization and International Human Rights Law, 54 DUKE L.J. 621, 
621–703 (2004); CARDENAS, supra note 20. 
39 See Risse & Ropp, supra note 21, at 16. 
40 See id. at 17. 
41 See id. 
whether “rule implementation” is centralized or decentralized given 
that states are not “unitary actors.”42 They characterize the fourth 
scope condition as material power, and the fifth as social pressure.43 
They suggest that the last two scope conditions can “relate to any given 
rule target’s vulnerability to external (as well as domestic) pressure.”44 
Bruce Bueno de Mesquita et al. similarly emphasize the role of scope 
conditions in the realization of human rights, particularly by asking 
“what aspects of democracy are most consequential in improving a 
state’s human rights record.”45 They find that “full” democracy, 
accountability, and “political participation at the level of multiparty 
competition” are most central to the delivery of human rights.46 
 In their lectures, Alston and Zeid Ra’ad Al Hussein not only focus 
on the significant shifts that are occurring globally in the scope 
conditions identified by Risse and Ropp and Bueno de Mesquita et al., 
but they also identify other structural, political, and social factors that 
are combining to create serious challenges for human rights, such as 
populism, poverty, and inequality.47 These sit together with other 
factors, such as the role of multinational companies, and enduring and 
emerging global challenges, such as climate change and artificial 
intelligence, all of which have serious implications for the enjoyment 
of human rights.  
 In such a context, narrowing or overweighting responsibility for 
backlash against human rights to one source—whether “internal” or 
“external”—overlooks the scale, complexity, and multifactorial nature 
of pushback and backlash and its connectedness to wider structural, 
social, and political contexts. It suggests that blowback can be 
understood (and thus resolved) in a one-dimensional way. Yet, a range 
of actors take issue with the international human rights system, 
including IHRL, for different reasons and at different points in time.48 
Some may reject the system entirely; others may take issue with a 
particular aspect, such as a specific decision, and generalize a position 
against the system, an institution, or IHRL from there; and still others 
may be supportive of some aspects of the system but not others.49 
Accordingly, the priority for the future of IHRL and the international 
human rights system more generally, is to assess how to effectively 
address the pushback in all its complexity. 
 
 
42 See id. at 18. 
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C. Recognizing Human Rights as a Self-Reflective Field 
 
 The preceding sections have demonstrated the range and 
complexity of the challenges facing the international human rights 
system. In such contexts, critical assessments of the threats to human 
rights and how to effectively respond to them are needed in scholarship 
and practice.50 However, some commentators, characterize human 
rights scholars and practitioners as displaying an “uncritical 
enthusiasm”51 for legalization and judicialization. This critique can be 
interpreted on two levels. First, it carries negative connotations about 
legalization and judicialization of human rights that risk diminishing 
the critical achievement of both acts in transforming human rights 
from “interests” to rights that can be claimed.52 Second, it suggests that 
human rights scholarship lacks the critical edge necessary to assess 
how it should adapt and respond, including through self-reflection and 
without being reactive, to significant and complex changes in society 
that are presenting serious risks to human rights.  
 In the earlier phases of the international human rights system—
as a staged work in progress—the focus was on standard setting and 
the building of institutions, many of which took the form of (quasi-) 
judicial bodies.53 At least at the international level, there was a leaning 
towards law building and ex post-facto accountability through the 
litigation of human rights claims.54 However, this phase should not be 
interpreted as a fetishization or monopolization process by law but 
rather as a critical achievement in the categorization of human 
interests into legally claimable rights.55 As Hurst Hannum recognizes 
in his recent monograph, “the notion that all people in the world 
possess certain rights – which their own government is obliged to 
protect – was nothing short of revolutionary.”56 This point is often 
overlooked in critiques of IHRL (which for some are in any case, 
“overstated,”57) which fail to properly engage with the impact the 
conferring of legal rights and their protection through legal processes 
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has meant, symbolically and practically, for many people whose rights 
have been infringed.58 The achievement and importance of the 
legalization of human rights should therefore not be underplayed as 
their conversion from ethical principles or human interests to legal 
rights that can be claimed was—and continues to be—groundbreaking 
and transformative across the globe.  
 The question arises, however,whether appreciation of the role of 
legalization necessarily equates to a lack of critical thinking about the 
law and judicial institutions. In the past, human rights scholarship has 
been criticized for splitting between high optimism and significant 
criticism,59 rather than taking a more nuanced approach to the field.60  
 However, the sustainability of claims that human rights 
scholarship and practice lacks critical pathways can now be 
questioned. While not necessarily labelled as critical scholarship on 
human rights, the growth in literature and policy analysis on the 
effectiveness, implementation, and mainstreaming of human rights 
displays a critical and reflective edge, while still committing to the 
normativity of human rights and the international human rights 
system.61 This literature is multidisciplinary and increasingly 
interdisciplinary, particularly with international legal scholarship 
drawing on the work of other disciplines, such as political science, 
sociology, and international relations.62 It represents a varied and 
layered body of critical work that examines the factors that account for 
the (in)effectiveness and (non)implementation of human rights, as well 
as the relationship of human rights to wider social, political, and 
economic contexts.63  
 Moreover, within international legal scholarship and practice, 
while legalization and judicialization have long been recognized as a 
critical component to realizing human rights, they have equally been 
understood as insufficient on their own.64 This is because the 
realization of human rights requires a much more complex and 
multifactorial approach. This accounts for the emphasis in scholarship 
and practice on creative and dynamic ways in which to realize human 
rights, with a greater emphasis on a plurality of means to secure the 
implementation, mainstreaming, acculturation, and orchestration of 
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human rights.65 This includes recent developments in the Human 
Rights Council to pay more attention to prevention, which has 
traditionally been neglected in favor of a focus on accountability.66 
Indeed, reflecting on Philip Alston’s lecture, Ron Dudai observes that,  
there is always a need for nuanced criticism among human rights advocates; 
while he distances himself from it, Alston’s piece is itself, for me, actually a great 
example of critical human rights scholarship: committed to the principles but 
ready to engage in self-critique, questioning some long-held beliefs . . . but doing 
it as a form of “insider critique” versed in the art and craft of human rights 
practice.67  
 This is the type of (self-)reflective scholarship that is increasingly 
evident in human rights scholarship and will be critical to assessments 
of the threats to human rights and the ways in which the international 
human rights system, with IHRL as a part, can effectively respond and 
adapt to changing local, national, and global politics and power bases. 
A key priority therefore for scholarship and practice is to intensify 
critical studies into how to address the multifactorial nature of 
pushback on human rights.  
III. THE FUTURE OF IHRL II: PRIORITIZING THE 
INTERPRETATION AND ADAPTATION OF IHRL TO 
PARTICULAR GROUPS AND NEW CONTEXTS  
 Beyond diagnosing and addressing pushback on the international 
human rights system, a further priority for IHRL is the interpretation 
and articulation of how IHRL applies to particular groups and to new 
contexts. As discussed in this part of the Article, this is critical if IHRL 
is to be effective and resilient in a changing world. This is an issue 
which has not received sufficient attention.  
 In the last decade, there has been a distinct cautionary approach 
to the adoption of new legal instruments. The reasons for caution in 
the pursuit of new treaties vary but are often based on principled, 
political, or pragmatic readings of what is possible.68 Some 
commentators argue that, in the current climate, attempts to develop 
a new law are not a good use of time and resources as they are unlikely 
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to come to fruition.69 Others argue that treaties should not be pursued 
in political contexts in which there is a risk that states may regress 
rather than progress existing international law, including by rolling 
back on existing obligations.70 Moreover, as already discussed, IHRL 
has moved much more towards compliance, implementation, and 
mainstreaming of human rights.71  
 While these reflect practical arguments against the pursuit of new 
legal instruments, IHRL still needs to be capable of development, like 
any branch of law. This is a particular need with regard to articulating 
how existing law applies to groups who are not able to enjoy their rights 
effectively in practice and to new contexts or global challenges, such as 
climate change or artificial intelligence. However, arguments against 
the creation of new instruments, particularly when framed as the 
“overextension” or “overexpansion” of IHRL to address “every social 
problem”72 can have the effect of stymying efforts to articulate how 
IHRL applies to these groups or contexts. This potentially creates a 
rights-protection gap. In this regard, this Article suggests that a 
distinction needs to be made between the creation of entirely new legal 
rights and the implementation of existing rights, through the 
articulation of how they apply to particular groups or new contexts. 
While such articulation may require the adoption of new instruments, 
the exercise is different in nature from the creation of new rights. The 
ability to articulate how IHRL applies to particular groups and new 
contexts is a critical dimension to the future of IHRL, if it is to offer 
effective protection and adapt to a changing world. However, it has not 
received sufficient attention as a particular category. Accordingly, a 
key priority for the future of IHRL is to distinguish between the 
normative development of IHRL and gap-filling exercises, requiring 
the articulation, codification, application, or implementation of an 
existing norm or the creation of an institution to support such 
implementation.73 
 For example, for particular groups, the articulation of how IHRL 
applies is important because while these groups are already protected 
under IHRL, they may not be able to enjoy their rights in practice.74 
The exercise is therefore about specifying how existing IHRL applies 
to enhance compliance by duty bearers and the ability to make rights 
claims. Very often, the adoption of instruments in relation to the rights 
of particular groups are mainly declaratory and explanatory of how 
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existing rights apply to particular groups,75 such as the Convention on 
the Elimination of Discrimination against Women and the Convention 
on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, the latter of which Frederic 
Megret typologizes as an instrument which affirms, reformulates, 
extends, and innovates in relation to existing rights.76 As a live debate, 
the UN Open Ended Working Group on Ageing is currently examining 
how to effectively protect the rights of older persons.77  A part of this 
discussion is whether a treaty on the rights of older persons is 
needed.78 While this has been dismissed by some, including human 
rights actors, as unnecessary, the argument has also been made that a 
treaty would enable the articulation of how existing IHRL applies to 
older persons, in order to affirm their existing rights, and would 
provide monitoring mechanisms that would be attuned to the rights of 
a group whose experience of human rights abuse is often overlooked by 
traditional human rights groups.79 Advocacy for a new treaty should 
not necessarily be read as an attempt to create “new” rights or extend 
IHRL further, but it can rather be seen as an attempt to articulate the 
application of IHRL to a particular group of people whose enjoyment of 
their existing rights is often at risk.  
  Making clear distinctions between the creation of new human 
rights and the articulation and adaptation of existing norms and 
unpacking critiques of overextension is therefore critical if IHRL is to 
effectively respond to protection gaps and new circumstances. On the 
one hand, in some instances, attempts to frame an issue as a human 
rights issue may be instrumental with the aim of benefiting from the 
moral authority associated with human rights, as well as providing the 
means to access national, regional, and international human rights 
mechanisms.80 On the other hand, they can reflect critiques of taking 
a human rights–based approach to a particular social or political 
context or global challenge, such as poverty, climate change, or 
artificial intelligence.81 Instrumental attempts to expand human 
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rights and IHRL can, of course, be resisted on the grounds that they 
take the branch outside of its intended bounds. Dudai presents this as 
a tension between “remaining relevant and aligned with the agendas 
of contemporary social movements” and avoiding engaging in a 
“superficial manner” and “creating more and more ‘new’ human 
rights,” as this can contribute to “diluting the human rights label.”82  
 However, concerns about instrumentalism, which can be 
addressed, should not be overstated as it is critical for the future of 
IHRL that it is agile and adaptable enough to be able to address new 
global challenges. It is also critical that concerns about expansion do 
not become a way in which to create obstacles or act as a gatekeeper to 
the recognition of rights-claims by particular groups or in particular 
contexts. In this regard, the application of IHRL to a particular issue 
does not reflect an attempt to change IHRL radically; use IHRL to fully 
“solve” the underlying social or political issue on its own; apply IHRL 
to contexts which do not involve risk to human rights; or redefine 
human rights in order to apply to the context. As Bielefeldt points out, 
human rights “have a limited scope and do not cover the entire 
spectrum of what makes up decent behavior and good and meaningful 
life . . .  human rights are not an all-encompassing ethical code or quasi-
religious comprehensive doctrine” and attempts to frame them in this 
way would “not only be politically stupid; it would also amount to 
overstating the claims of human rights.”83 Indeed, for IHRL such a 
reading would clearly set it up to fail as it—like all law—will never be 
in the position to singularly resolve complex social, political, and global 
challenges as they require multidisciplinary approaches.  
 Rather, where IHRL is called upon to articulate how it applies to 
a particular group or context, it is typically because human rights are 
at risk, and it is therefore within the scope of IHRL to respond. The 
form this response takes should align to the IHRL framework and its 
particular methodology.84 In circumstances where human rights as 
defined under IHRL are at risk, it would seem perverse to argue that 
IHRL could not be applied because human rights are set within a wider 
social or political context; in reality, they always are. To find otherwise 
could result in gaps in the coverage of IHRL simply because a new 
context, such as artificial intelligence, emerges that was not envisaged 
at the time of the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights. Thus, the question is not whether IHRL applies to particular 
groups or in particular contexts. Rather, the question is whether it is 
sufficient to apply IHRL on a case-by-case basis using the existing law 
and mechanisms or whether a dedicated initiative is required to set 
standards, even if only declaratory, in order to provide guidance on how 
IHRL applies in particular circumstances to enhance compliance and 
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implementation. In this regard, if IHRL is to develop in an effective 
and resilient manner, much greater attention and space is needed to 
provide guidance on how IHRL applies to particular groups whose 
rights are at risk and to new contexts. 
 Such an exercise would entail an interpretation and articulation 
of how the existing set of legally defined and internationally agreed 
human rights, with developed tests to interpret when they have been 
infringed, apply to a particular group or in a particular context.85 It 
would also involve an interpretation and articulation of how the 
existing obligations of states and responsibilities of businesses to 
prevent human rights being put at risk in the first place; the 
establishment of monitoring, oversight, and accountability processes to 
identify and act where risks arise; and access to justice, where 
allegations are made of human rights violations.86  The exercise would 
therefore not be about changing the nature of IHRL but rather using 
its particular, but not exclusive, methodology for the promotion and 
protection of human rights, where rights are at risk. 
 Indeed, this is the point that Alston makes in his lecture when 
arguing that the international human rights system has not given 
sufficient priority to economic and social rights as a particular 
contribution to dealing with poverty.87 He is clear that his point is not  
“moving the focus [of the international human rights system] to the 
blight of poverty, or to denials of dignity, or even to the need for more 
resources for development,” but to use the power of the system to 
address and contribute to the promotion and protection of economic 
and social rights through what he calls “recognition, 
institutionalization and accountability.”88 He is thus making the case 
that as rights are impacted, the international human rights system has 
a role to play. However, he is locating this role within a wider set of 
solutions rather than claiming that the international human rights 
system, or IHRL, is sufficient or should change or widen beyond its 
established way of working.  
 As with the cautionary approach to new law and the focus on 
implementation, by reframing claims of expansion as application, 
articulation, and mainstreaming of existing IHRL to existing rights 
holders and duty bearers, the claim of overexpansion becomes harder 
to sustain on the scale often presented.89 This characterization much 
more closely reflects the practice in which there are very few attempts 
to create new rights but rather the focus is often on clarification of the 
normative scope and contours of a right and whether this evolves over 
time. For example, much of the focus of the guidelines on prison 
standards and detention, such as the recently updated UN Standard 
Minimum Rules on the Treatment of Prisoners (renamed the Mandela 
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Rules), do not reflect efforts to create new rights but to rewrite certain 
rules in order to ensure that they reflect current international law.90 
Similarly, the UN Special Rapporteur on Torture produced reports 
aimed at understanding the definition of solitary confinement in order 
to articulate when the practice amounts to a violation of the prohibition 
of torture.91 
 Moreover, where debates are explicitly referred to as entailing 
new rights, questions still arise as to whether this is the appropriate 
presentation or whether the issue is actually one of norm articulation.  
This is a particularly live debate with regard to artificial intelligence, 
with some actors arguing that new rights need to be created, such as a 
right to encryption or human decision-making, whereas other actors 
suggest that these issues can be dealt with by using the existing human 
rights framework. For example, the argument is made that, at least 
given current technological capabilities, due process would require a 
human decision maker because algorithms cannot make individualized 
decisions but rely on group-based correlations, therefore there is no 
need for a new right to human decision-making.92 Similarly, the 
Vatican recently criticized a report by the UN Special Rapporteur on 
Freedom of Religion or Belief on the grounds that he has created a new 
human right to freedom from religion through conscientious 
objection.93 However, the Special Rapporteur argued that while not 
expressly stated, a right to conscientious objection constitutes a logical 
deduction from the right to freedom of religion, on the basis of 
noncoercion, and therefore cannot be considered mission creep.94 
 This recasting is important as it enables arguments to create new 
rights to be seen in a more exceptional light. This allows for an 
assessment of whether enduring and emerging challenges to human 
rights reveal particular gaps within IHRL and whether they need to be 
filled. In this regard, Gillian MacNaughton, for example, argues in 
favor of a right to equality.95 She critiques the international human 
rights community as addressing horizontal inequalities but not vertical 
inequalities of “income, wealth and social outcome either between or 
within countries.”96 She quotes Philip Alston in his position as Special 
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Rapporteur as arguing that “a human rights framework that does not 
address extreme inequality as one of the drivers of extreme poverty 
and as one of the reasons why over one quarter of humanity cannot 
properly enjoy human rights is doomed to fail.”97 However, she 
critiques him for treating “vertical inequalities as merely 
instrumentally related to human rights.”98 She suggests that “[i]n the 
absence of a recognised right to equality, that is economic and social 
equality, human rights scholars and practitioners rely upon other 
international human rights standards that could indirectly reduce 
vertical inequalities.”99 This is both a substantive and, as discussed 
below, a methodological question about what the content of IHRL 
should be, and how human rights actors understand and work on the 
conditions in which the (non)realization of rights are set.100  
 While the current trend tends to be against the creation of new 
instruments, for a range of principled and practical reasons, gaps of 
different types will still open up. IHRL continues to be a work in 
progress and one that has to evolve with the context in which it applies, 
which includes new forms of challenges in which human rights are put 
at risk, and new power bases beyond the original state focus. In this 
regard, IHRL needs to be open to the possibility of gaps emerging that 
may need to be filled rather than assume a static position. This is 
easier to do in contexts in which IHRL is not presented as engaged in 
endless expansion but rather in articulation and application of existing 
law to contexts in which human rights are at risk.  
IV. THE FUTURE OF IHRL III: OPERATIONALIZATION AND REVALUING 
LAW AND THE COURTS 
 Parts II and III of this Article have emphasized the importance of 
IHRL effectively responding to the challenges and threats to human 
rights as part of a wider, multidisciplinary approach to the promotion 
and protection of human rights. While this may sometimes entail new 
substantive or procedural law, where specific gaps in IHRL are 
identified, the priority for IHRL—and the international human rights 
system—remains implementation, particularly with regard to 
operationalization of IHRL, and adaptation to new contexts where 
rights are at risk as a means to increase its effectiveness. This final 
Part of the Article turns to the methods and approaches needed to 
achieve this objective. 
 Some scholars continue to argue that the international human 
rights movement over-relies on law and (quasi-)judicial bodies.101 As 
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already argued in this Article, in the earlier stages of the modern 
international human rights system, a greater emphasis may have been 
placed on standard setting and legal accountability in order to ensure 
that individuals could claim their rights.102 However, as suggested 
throughout this Article, following the achievement of legalization and 
judicialization, there has been a shift towards implementation and 
adaptation as well as prevention, which necessarily requires a 
plurality of methods.103 This Part will propose ways in which to further 
develop approaches to the implementation of human rights, 
particularly in terms of operationalization, including ways to address 
enduring and emerging challenges to human rights. In doing so, this 
Article suggests that through a focus on operationalization, the role of 
courts and (quasi-)judicial bodies can also be revalued as part of a 
pluralistic approach to human rights and IHRL. 
A. Implementation of Human Rights 
 This Article suggests that the future of the international human 
rights system, of which IHRL is a part, lies with assessments of how it 
can most effectively contribute to the enduring and emerging 
challenges to human rights. This may seem an obvious point, but in 
practice is a complex task, particularly given the level of current 
threats to human rights. As with all law, IHRL offers a means and a 
contribution to addressing threats to human rights. However, the 
contribution of other disciplines is also critical, particularly where 
risks to human rights emanate from and take place within changes in 
scope and structural conditions in society or within the context of major 
enduring and emerging global challenges, such as inequality, poverty, 
climate change, and artificial intelligence.104 While multidisciplinary 
and interdisciplinary approaches to human rights (and social and 
political challenges and global problems) are often promoted, in 
practice, effective interdisciplinarity is still at an early stage of 
development.105 More research and analysis are therefore needed to 
determine when and how interdisciplinarity is effectively achieved, 
both in terms of dealing with human rights issues in general and as 
part of wider social, political, and global problems. 
 Beyond interdisciplinarity, the effectiveness and implementation 
of human rights also relies on the operationalization of IHRL within 
the wider strategies, policies, and agendas of key actors that have the 
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power and ability to effect change.106 Operationalization as an 
approach is particularly important as it can result in the integration of 
IHRL within the strategic and operational approaches of such actors 
and thus avoids IHRL becoming siloed or seen as an “add-on.”107 It also 
helps provide greater attention to prevention rather than ex post-facto 
accountability, which while critical, is insufficient to bring about 
significant change.108  
 The state remains the central duty bearer within IHRL, a point 
that can often be missed in discourse on human rights.109 This is 
particularly the case when analyzing approaches to dealing with global 
challenges, such as artificial intelligence, where actors can focus on the 
role of major technology companies while overlooking that states 
continue to have obligations with regard to human rights, despite the 
power of businesses.110 In this regard, the scholarship on and the 
practice of IHRL are increasingly recognizing that the state is not a 
monolith and for its obligations under IHRL to be effectively realized, 
attention needs to be paid to all levels of the state and their 
interrelationship.111 As Paul Hunt has emphasized, this includes 
ministries beyond the foreign office and ministry of justice.112 Thus, 
when states receive concluding observations from UN treaty bodies 
and recommendations through the Universal Periodic Review process, 
the relevant ministries responsible for the portfolios to which the 
recommendations relate need to take the lead on their implementation 
in coordination with other ministries.113 While this may seem a 
straightforward point, ministries outside of the foreign office 
responsible for negotiating international law and representing the 
state in international human rights forums do not always have a strong 
record of integrating IHRL into their policies and practices, even where 
the state has ratified treaties that directly connect to their 
portfolios.114 Moreover, states have only recently started to establish 
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national implementation and follow-up mechanisms to coordinate the 
implementation of recommendations from international and regional 
human rights bodies.115  
 Operationalization of IHRL within states is not only a horizontal 
question but also relates to local and municipal governmental 
authorities.  While this has been a central part of literature on the 
globalization of human rights and is recognized in practice,116 it has 
only recently begun to receive attention in mainstream IHRL 
literature.117 This is because local governments take many decisions 
that affect economic and social rights, such as education, housing, and 
social care. Economic and social rights are beginning to be prioritized, 
even in states such as the United Kingdom that have not incorporated 
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
into domestic law.118  In a recent resolution, the UN Human Rights 
Council underscored the importance of local government as a human 
rights actor, noting that, “given its proximity to people and being at the 
grass-roots level, one of the important functions of local government is 
to provide public services that address local needs and priorities 
related to the realization of human rights at the local level.”119 Oomen 
and Baumgartel also observe that “local authorities hold the potential 
to reinforce the legitimacy and effectiveness of international law.”120 
 The importance of local and municipal governments as human 
rights actors is also becoming increasingly apparent in response to 
central global challenges, such as climate change and artificial 
intelligence. For example, employment of big data and new 
technologies by state agencies and the emergence of smart cities, pose 
significant risks to human rights.121 Smart cities have been promoted 
as transformative to the administration of cities, particularly from an 
efficiency perspective.122 However, as they rely on big data analytics 
and machine learning, they raise inherent threats to the right to 
privacy and can result in discrimination.123 Depending on the decisions 
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municipal actors make using the data collected, they potentially raise 
risks to other human rights, including access to housing and 
education.124 These risks could be aggravated depending on how the 
technology and data are integrated. The types of technologies used in 
smart cities and how the data is amalgamated, shared, and accessed 
all vary. However, at its extreme, it could mean that an array of 
technology used in smart cities, from home sensors, to automated 
traffic lights, to live facial recognition technologies in public spaces, 
may then use and produce data that is fed into a central database, 
which itself may consist of integrated public and private  sets, such as 
health, law enforcement, and education data.125 Such scenarios raise 
questions of a “surveillance society” and the extent to which the 
insights gleaned from the smart city are shared with other parts of 
government or other actors, such as companies and other states.126 The 
human rights impact of smart cities, the models for their governance 
and regulation, and the technology and data upon which they rely are 
only beginning to be researched and analyzed. These potential 
developments further emphasize the increasing centrality of municipal 
governments to human rights and the importance, therefore, of 
operationalizing IHRL within their agendas.  
 Indeed, the critical role of local government has recently been 
underscored in relation to the use and live testing of facial recognition 
technology in the United States. This technology connects to databases 
on individuals suspected of having committed crimes. However, it has 
been documented to be inaccurate, particularly in relation to nonwhite 
nonmales, as well as heightening the possibilities for human rights 
violations and changing the way in which agencies, such as the police, 
work with wider implications for democracy.127 The American Civil 
Liberties Union and other human rights organizations have therefore 
challenged its use and live testing.128 Local governments and city 
administrations have emerged as central human rights actors in this 
regard, with some US cities already introducing a moratorium on the 
use of facial recognition technology until the technical and human 
rights risks can be attended to.129 
 Accordingly, significant work still needs to be done on building 
capacity and institutional mechanisms to ensure that IHRL is 
operationalized across governments. This is not a small task in that 
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mainstreaming human rights creates significant demands on the 
promotion of norm literacy and clarification, if these new actors are to 
be able to navigate the intersections, tensions, and synergies among 
competing rights—and other—claims. 
 Beyond the state, a key priority continues to be the embedding of 
human rights within businesses in line with the UN Guiding Principles 
on Business and Human Rights and the proposed treaty.130 The recent 
incidents involving large technology companies, such as the data access 
by Cambridge Analytica from Facebook and the role of Facebook in 
Myanmar, highlight the potential for major technology companies to 
impact human rights.131 However, they also raise questions on the 
adequacy of the current IHRL framework where it does not impose 
direct obligations, but responsibilities on businesses.132 Within this 
context, operationalizing human rights within the strategies and 
operations of businesses becomes even more important in order to 
ensure that risks to human rights are identified, and oversight and 
monitoring mechanisms are in place.133 In this regard, while certain 
tools such as human rights impact assessments and social auditing of 
businesses to certify if they are “human rights compliant” have been 
developed, much more work needs to be done to fully develop the 
content and nature of businesses’ responsibilities to respect human 
rights. Moreover, a particularly neglected issue in this regard relates 
to the right to an effective remedy for business-related harm to human 
rights. This is both in relation to the procedural obligation to provide 
access to a remedy as well as the substantive reparation required to 
repair harm. This is therefore an area that requires prioritization.134  
 Given that human rights issues arise within social and political 
contexts as well as in relation to global challenges, operationalization 
of human rights also needs to be thought of in relation to the social and 
political movements that work on these contexts and challenges. This 
connects with the concept of “orchestration,” whereby an international 
organization “enlists and supports intermediary actors to address 
target actors [such as states] in pursuit of IGO governance goals.”135 
While states and businesses are often the focus of operationalization 
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due to their position as duty bearers, social movements as a third 
category for operationalization have rarely received attention in 
mainstream human rights scholarship, particularly legal scholarship, 
although their critical role in the orchestration of human rights has 
been the subject of scholarly attention.136 Their role has two 
dimensions. First, it relates to conveying the relevance of IHRL to such 
contexts and challenges.137 This is not a new point. Human rights 
scholars have long pointed to the importance and increased 
effectiveness of human rights and IHRL, particularly judicial 
decisions, when embedded within the agendas of wider social or 
political movements.138 This was a key point made by James Cavallaro 
and Stephanie Brewer in their article on the implementation of 
decisions by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights.139 Karima 
Bennoune also points out the “reality on the ground” that “[h]uman 
rights advocates in many places are working with, supporting and 
building social movements, and working to mobilize broader 
constituencies, sometimes at risk of their very lives.”140 
 However, in the Global North, the issue has come to the forefront 
more recently in light of a number of popular movements that either 
do not appear to have considered human rights or have been hostile to 
them.141 Dudai reflects that a, 
 
key factor in re-energizing human rights is to reconnect human 
rights with social movements struggles on the ground. Human 
rights—as slogans, values, methods, laws, and institutional 
machinery—are most effectively deployed not in the abstract 
but in conjunction with and in support of specific campaigns, 
and their role and function should be to assist in such concrete 
struggles.142 
 
 A shift, therefore, may be needed, not only in articulating the role 
that human rights and IHRL can play within social movements but 
also for human rights institutions and the human rights community to 
engage with a wider set of disciplines and in partnership develop 
integrated approaches to addressing these challenges. This may seem 
an obvious point, but IHRL and actors that primarily work on IHRL 
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have not always had a history of integrating into wider approaches.143 
It returns to the issue of scope conditions discussed in the first Part of 
this Article in that human rights issues are integrally connected with 
context and can be put at risk due to other social issues. However, they 
are unlikely to be resolved through IHRL alone, and thus the effective 
promotion and protection of human rights is also conditional on 
addressing wider scope conditions.  
 As already discussed, how this is done is not by claiming that 
human rights or IHRL offer the exclusive solution to a particular social 
issue or that IHRL should widen beyond what it can offer. Rather, the 
operationalization agenda focuses on embedding and demonstrating 
the particular role, methodology, and value of IHRL and a human 
rights–based approach more broadly as contributions to addressing 
wider social agendas. As Dudai suggests, “the lesson from this should 
perhaps be acceptance of the limitations of human rights in providing 
a full mobilizing vision, and recognition of a more modest role for 
human rights in serving as one component in other social/political 
visions.”144 
 Second, existing literature often discusses the barriers to the 
international human rights movement for nonlawyers due to the 
dominance of lawyers in the field.145 However, this issue is not uni-
directional. The embedding of human rights and IHRL within social 
agendas requires the sensitization of legal actors as well as human 
rights actors (that often focus on the documentation of human rights 
violations and the employment of legal strategies to combat them) to 
the wider contexts in which human rights issues arise. This requires a 
recognition of how the approaches they undertake fit within a wider 
and multidisciplinary approach to human rights and to the social and 
political contexts concerned. This can require a significant shift in the 
methodology and approach of human rights organizations. In 2004, 
Kenneth Roth of Human Rights Watch reflected on the challenges for 
human rights organizations in addressing economic, social, and 
cultural rights.146 His article was not normatively opposed to 
addressing these rights, but he reflected on how well the methodology 
of his organization, at the time “shaming and the generation of public 
pressure,” fit with such rights.147 This is an interesting reflection on 
methodology and the extent to which it shapes the ability to work on 
particular rights’ issues or locate them within broader movements. 
More recently, in the wake of the Grenfell Tower fire in London, 
Andrew Fagan argued that a number of human rights organizations 
made calls for legal accountability but failed to call for the examination 
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of the wider social and political structures that may have enabled the 
situation in the first place.148 This again points to the types of 
methodologies employed by human rights organizations and whether 
they are sufficient. Equally, while IHRL and certain legal mechanisms 
may be ill-suited to examine the structural conditions that led to a 
human rights violation,149 greater efforts can be made by certain 
legally focused human rights actors to understand and situate 
themselves within wider approaches to addressing social and global 
challenges and to articulate the nature and limitations of their 
contribution within a wider matrix.150 It also emphasizes again that 
IHRL does not offer all the solutions to the protection of human 
rights.151 Thus, other approaches focused on structural conditions and 
the scope conditions discussed at the beginning of this Article will also 
be critical to whether human rights are protected, but may not be fully 
within the remit of IHRL specifically.152 
 However, like the operationalization agenda with states and 
businesses, challenges remain with demonstrating the relevance and 
value of human rights, IHRL, and a wider human rights–based 
approach to social agendas, including the role of international 
institutions and courts.153 Significant work and theorizing are 
therefore required on how IHRL and the broader international human 
rights system can operate dynamically among the local, national, 
transnational, and international levels. A part of this challenge relates 
to demonstrating the particular contributions of human rights and 
IHRL to wider social movements. This can be challenging as actors 
involved in such movements may have preconceptions or only partial, 
narrow understandings of what human rights entail.154 For example, 
in the artificial intelligence sector, an actor recently commented to the 
author of this Article that they had not previously thought of looking 
at IHRL as part of the strategies employed to address the social impact 
of artificial intelligence and emerging technologies, as they saw it 
narrowly as about privacy and data protection rather than about ways 
of understanding harm more broadly. They commented that now that 
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they were engaging with IHRL, they saw that in some ways they had 
already been using IHRL concepts without labelling them as such.155  
 Care also has to be taken in how the connections between the 
human rights movement and social approaches are forged to avoid the 
impression that human rights actors are “parachuting” into social 
struggles, which actors have worked on for many years without 
attention from major national or international bodies. The embedding 
of human rights and IHRL within social movements therefore has to 
be approached from a perspective of equality and partnership and not 
appropriation and instrumentalization. 
 With all three approaches to operationalizing human rights 
within the strategies, policies, and agendas of states, businesses, and 
social movements, opportunities arise for dispelling myths about 
human rights and IHRL and demonstrating its concrete and practical 
value and contributions. Equally, by pluralizing the actors responsible 
for promoting and protecting human rights, the number of interpreters 
and appliers of rights increases.156 This risks a plurality of 
interpretations and a diffusion and divergence of interpretation and 
meaning of human rights.157 It also risks the instrumentalization of 
human rights to fit actors’ agendas, which inevitably can lead to a 
“pick-n-mix approach.”158 For example, this is a critique that has been 
made within the approaches of technology companies to ethical and 
human rights–based approaches to artificial intelligence.159 Where 
human rights are taken up by social movements, there is also the risk 
that they become associated with one particular political view and thus 
alienate other communities, or that concessions are made on aspects of 
human rights to fit with a wider social agenda.160 These risks do not, 
necessarily, warrant the rejection of the operationalization of human 
rights with such actors, for example, but are factors that will have to 
be addressed, navigated, and studied from an effectiveness 
perspective, as the operationalization of IHRL develops and matures. 
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B. Revaluing Courts 
 As already noted, some commentators continue to critique the 
international human rights system as overly legal and judicialized.161 
This does not reflect a new critique.162 Yet, as argued in the first Part 
of this Article, without recognizing the critical role the legalization and 
judicialization of rights has played in the protection of human rights, 
many of these critiques of IHRL underplay the transformational 
achievements of the international human rights system across the 
globe. Moreover, claims of a dominance of legalization and 
judicialization are not necessarily an accurate reflection of what 
happens in practice, particularly in states where legal strategies have 
formed part of wider campaigns.163 However, at least in the earlier 
phases of the international human rights system, (quasi-)judicial 
bodies were seen as central institutions both to develop IHRL and as a 
means of accountability, particularly in states with ineffective or 
unavailable judicial systems. It was in part because those institutions 
were available and the most concrete means of achieving an outcome 
for individuals and groups. It was also because other approaches, such 
as the prevention of human rights violations have, until recently, 
remained underdeveloped in comparison, although this is now on the 
agenda of the UN Human Rights Council.164 
 In this regard, some of the critiques of the dominance of courts 
have emanated from the absence or insufficient attention and 
investment in other approaches. This has led both to a devaluing of 
courts and over expectation of what they can achieve. As central 
institutions within the international human rights landscape, the 
expectations on such bodies—particularly in the absence of other types 
of approaches and institutions—have been high.165 While a different 
branch of international law, current critiques of the International 
Criminal Court provide interesting analogies to the critiques of some 
human rights bodies. Reflecting on these critiques, some commentators 
have noted that the expectations of what could be achieved through a 
judicial body set it up for (perceived) failure.166 For example, Kersten 
notes that, both the court and its  
 
most fervent champions . . . insisted that the Court would end impunity 
for international crimes, put victims front and center in all of its work, 
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transcend global power relations, deter mass atrocities, hold the most 
powerful to account, promote reconciliation… you name it. It’s a 
laundry list of things that the ICC didn’t achieve because it couldn’t 
achieve them.167 
 
 In taking a fuller approach to the realization of human rights, 
particularly through an expanded version of operationalization, it 
becomes possible not only to rebut claims that the international human 
rights structures over-rely on courts but also to revalue courts within 
plural methodologies to advance human rights. Relieving the pressure 
and expectation on courts as the “main” vehicle through which to 
deliver human rights enables a reimagining of their role within a 
pluralized landscape.168 Much of the current discussion on (quasi-) 
judicial bodies focuses on funding cuts, backlogs, and non-
implementation of judgments. This has forced debates and concrete 
policy changes on whether they should be forums for individual justice 
or whether they should focus on structural issues and repetitive 
violations.169 Seeking more effective plural forms of the 
implementation of human rights may assist in reframing the narrative 
around courts and enable them to reclaim their role as part of wider 
human rights movements and campaigns and also as aspirational 
institutions.  
 This is particularly important as the critiques of the dominance of 
courts overlook the significant contributions courts have made not only 
in developing the corpus of IHRL but in delivering justice for 
individuals and groups.170 In this regard, courts are critical 
institutions in protecting individuals against majoritarian 
tendencies.171 Judicial forums can be ill-suited for diagnosing and 
addressing the structural causes of human rights violations. Moreover, 
courts, particularly at the international level, are attuned to the 
challenges of specificity in reparation orders, given their lack of 
detailed knowledge of the landscape in each member state.172 At the 
same time, courts such as the Inter-American Court of Human Rights 
have made critical contributions to addressing structural conditions 
that facilitate human rights violations within their jurisprudence on 
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reparations, for example.173 This role is enhanced where the parties in 
a case address specific reparation orders in their pleadings with 
supporting evidence which can reduce courts’ perceptions that they are 
ill-equipped or have insufficient information to make specific 
reparation orders that address wider policies, practices or structural 
conditions.174 These reparation orders can then provide advocates and 
civil society with a concrete tool to pursue in law and policy reform as 
a means of compliance with the decision.175 Court decisions that 
protect the rights of minorities or groups in vulnerable or marginalized 
positions have also led to change by providing a narrative for 
governments to reform laws or policies, in the face of resistance by 
parts of the population. Laurence Helfer and Erik Voeten argue, for 
example, that international courts can “help overcome domestic 
opposition to policy change under particular institutional and political 
circumstances,” using the example of the European Court of Human 
Rights’ case law on LGBT rights to illustrate their point.176 When part 
of wider approaches to human rights, courts can be important bodies 
in delivering social change. Courts can therefore be a part of the wider 
operationalization agenda without being the sole prism through which 
expectations are made of the international human rights system.  
V. CONCLUSION 
 Unlike some commentators who depict IHRL as an uncritical 
branch of international law or the international human rights system 
more generally as unreflective, this Article, has suggested that 
scholarship and practice on human rights indicates a critical and self-
reflective edge, aimed at assessing and improving IHRL in order to 
effectively address the significant challenges to the enjoyment of 
human rights around the world. Drawing on this literature and 
practice, this Article has identified three key priorities for the 
development of IHRL which are necessary to fulfill if IHRL is to remain 
relevant and resilient in a changing world. The challenges and 
pushback IHRL faces cannot be reduced to one source or explanation. 
Rather, they are multifactorial and shift depending on the actor and 
point in time. They also cannot be separated from the wider pushback 
against the international rule of law and international institutions or 
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from the structural, societal and political changes in society. 
Effectively addressing this pushback therefore requires equally 
complex and nuanced approaches. IHRL and its institutions cannot 
achieve this alone, but they need to be located within and interact with 
other disciplinary approaches. This Article suggests that this can be 
more effectively achieved where IHRL embeds within the agendas of 
key actors that are capable of protecting human rights. These actors 
include state agencies, which requires a mainstreaming of human 
rights across state agencies as well as at the level of local government. 
This is in addition to the deepening of the business and human rights 
agenda and the integration of human rights principles within the 
agendas of social movements. Inevitably, the mainstreaming of human 
rights in this way will introduce new challenges through the 
pluralization of the actors engaged in the promotion and protection of 
human rights. However, it is a necessary approach for IHRL to make 
a meaningful impact where human rights are at risk. 
 This Article has acknowledged that IHRL and its institutions face 
significant pushback. However, it has equally argued that this is not a 
time for retraction or standing still. Rather, space needs to remain for 
the development of new substantive and procedural law, where an 
analysis of IHRL in context reveals gaps in the promotion and 
protection of human rights. However, for the most part, the focus on 
the evolution of IHRL should be on ensuring its implementation in 
dealing with enduring and emerging challenges for human rights. 
Accordingly, this Article has proposed a much clearer distinction 
between the exceptional circumstances in which the creation of new 
rights is proposed and situations in which IHRL needs to be 
interpreted and adapted to fill protection-gaps arising for particular 
groups who are not enjoying their rights in practice or because of new 
contexts or global challenges that introduce new rights’ issues.  
 Within this context, human rights scholarship and practice have 
moved beyond a focus on standard setting and judicialization, although 
both remain important components, towards complex, multilayered, 
and multidisciplinary and interdisciplinary approaches to human 
rights. Scholars have started to develop “thicker” approaches to the 
development of IHRL, within which this Article aligns and builds upon. 
These include a four-strand approach.177 First, on legalization, 
advocacy, and socialization, what Stephen Hopgood et al. call the 
“mainstream” approach to date.178 Second, engaging, bargaining, and 
negotiating with backlash.179 Third, framing or translating rights to 
resonate with local contexts.180 Fourth, examining synergies with 
other agendas, like the Sustainable Development Goals.181 This is a 
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significant and ambitious agenda, which will be met with obstacles, 
challenges, instrumentalization of rights, and dead ends. However, if 
IHRL is to fully operationalize and result in the realization of human 
rights for those most affected, it needs to be able to embed within the 
contexts in which rights are affected and to partner and contribute to 
wider agendas and strategies that can benefit rights’ protection, either 
directly or through addressing scope and structural conditions.  
